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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR
ASSUMPTION OF RISK-
WHAT IS A PATIENT TO DO?
ROBERT W. RICHART*
This article will discuss three doctrines commonly found in
medical malpractice cases, and analyze how they relate to one
another in such a case. These three doctrines are Contributory
Negligence, Informed Consent and Assumption of Risk.
Although adoption of comparative negligence has done away
with the defense of contributory negligence in many jurisdictions,'
the retention of assumption of risk still makes the study of con-
tributory negligence in its relationship to assumption of risk an im-
portant area of study for the practicing attorney.
I. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
"Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plain-
tiff which falls below the standard to which he should conform for
his own protection, and which is a legally contributing cause
cooperating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about
the plaintiff's harm. "2 As contributory negligence is applied to
malpractice cases, as elsewhere, a confusion of words exists, as
described by Dean Prosser, 3 wherein some courts state that any
negligence which contributes to the injury, however slight, in any
degree, bares recovery. 4 Other courts state that the contribution
*Attorney in Joplin, Missouri; B.A., 1963, Northwestern University. J.D., 1965, Tulane
University.
1. See, e.g., Krise v. Gillund, 184 N.W.2d 405 (N.D. 1971). Comparative negligence was
codified in North Dakota in 1973. 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws Ch. 78 codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-
10-07 (1975).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965).
3. W. PROSSER, LAWOF TORTS421 (4th ed. 1971).
4. Aitchison v. Reter, 245 Iowa 1005, 64 N.W.2d 923 (1954).
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must have been substantial.' In all courts, however, the application
of the doctrine centers upon examination of the degree to which the
plaintiff's negligence contributed to the damage, and not to the ex-
tent to which plaintiff was negligent .
6
There is one aspect in which courts have varied from their nor-
mal application of contributory negligence; when the case concerns
true malpractice and not merely a suit against a health-care
provider for negligence. This long-standing distinction7 was stated
by one New York court as follows:
There are situations in actions loosely labeled malpractice
where the charge of dereliction is indistinguishable from
the ordinary charge of negligence. The bulk of such ac-
tions are against hospitals, but it is conceiveable that one
could arise against a doctor. In such a case, applying the
rule that contributory negligence defeats the action would
be entirely proper. But where the gravamen of the action
is the improper professional treatment, the patient's
failure to follow instructions does not defeat the action. If
the failure increases the extent of the injury, damages
would be reduced to that degree. 8
The rationale for this distinction appears to be based upon the
principle of proximate causation.
To constitute a bar to the suit the negligence of the patient
must have been an active and efficient coptributing cause
of the injury. In other words, contributory negligence to
defeat a right of action must be simultaneous and
cooperating with the fault of the defendant, must have en-
tered into the creation of the cause of action, and have
been an element in the transaction which constituted it.
Where the fault of the patient was subsequent to the fault
of the physician and merely aggravated the injury in-
flicted by the physician, it only affects the amount of
damages recoverable by the patient. 9
5. See, e.g., \Vest v. Martin. 31 Mo. 375. (1861). \,herein it is said that *[T]he rule in such cases
seems to be that if the plaintiff substantially contributed to the injury by his improper or negligent
conduct, he can not recover: but it the injurv wsas occasioned b\ the itproper or negligent conduct ot
the defendant and the plaintiffdid not substantially contribute to produce it. then the latter would be
entitled to the verdict. Id. at 379.
6. NV. PROSSERsupra note 3. at 421.
7. See, e.g.. Fowler v. Sergeant. 1 Grant. Cas. 355 (Pa. 1856).
8. Morse v. Rapkin, 24 App. Div. 2d 24. 263 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1965).
9.21 R.C.L. 402-03 (1918).
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North Dakota is apparently, but not without question, one of the
few states which does Dot adhere to this distinction. 10
One of the most extreme statements of this modification was
made in Krauss v. Ballinger, I Iin which the court stated as follows:
If the appellants did not set the arm properly, they might
be liable even if the appellee did not in every particular
carry out their instructions. The appellants might also be
liable if their treatment of the arm subsequent to the set-
ting was improper, although the appellee did not in all
respects carry out their instructions.'
2
One point in time at which the plaintiff may be negligent is
prior to the negligence of the physician. There is some question as
to whether this can constitute contributory negligence. In Sales v.
Bacigalupi, 13 the plaintiff accidently punctured her foot with a nail,
which wound she unsuccessfully treated with home remedies. The
court held that the issue of such self-treatment being contributory
negligence was one for the jury.' 4 This is apparently in conflict with
the requirement that, in order for plaintiff's negligence to be a bar
to recovery, such negligence must have been "an active and ef-
ficient contributing cause of the injury occasioned by the malprac-
tice of his physician," ' 5 and the decision has led one author to make
the bold assertion that in fact such authority "should dispel any
notion that contributory negligence must be contemporaneous with
or subsequent to the physician defendant's negligence."16
A case reaching a contrary conclusion is Hibbard v. Thomp-
son. 'I The court in upholding an instruction which authorized the
jury to find for and award to plaintiff for such of plaintiff's injuries
as might be separable from those caused by his own negligence, set
10. "A patient cannot recover in an action against his physician for damages for malpractice if
he has not conformed to all reasonable directions of such physician or if his conduct has contributed
to the injury upon which the action is based." McDonnell v. Monteith, 59 N.D. 750, 756, 231 N.W.
854, 857 (1930). See also Hanson v. Thelan, 42 N.D. 617, 173 N.W. 457 (1919) where the rule was
stated that "the patient must not have contributed to his injury in any degree; that he must conform
to all reasonable directions of his physician, otherwise he cannot recover." Id. at 621, 173 N.W. at
458. But see Halverson v. Zimmerman, 60 N.D. 113, 232 N.W. 754 (1930), decided two months after
McDonnell, in which although the court's discussion of the facts emphasized and centered upon the
plaintiff having followed all of the defendant's directions, the above quoted statement from Ruling
Case Law was cited with apparent approval. And see Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1043 at 1056 (1956),
which cites Halverson as following the majority rule.
11. 171 Ill. App. 534(1912).
12. Krauss v. Ballinger, 171 Ill. App. 534, 539 (1912).
13.47 Cal. App. 2d 82, 117 P.2d 399 (1941).
14. Sales v. Bacigalupi, 47 Cal. App. 2d 82, -, 117 P.2d 399, 402 (1941).
15. Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1043, 1046 (1956).
16. Contributory Negligence as a Defense to Medical Malpractice in California, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 386, 396
(1973).
17. 109 Mass. 286(1872).
239
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
forth its reasoning for this limitation to the general rule by ex-
plaining as follows:
It is an important limitation; for a physician may be
called to prescribe for cases which originated in the
carelessness of the patient; and though such carelessness
would remotely contribute to the injury sued for, it would
not relieve the physician from liability for his distinct
negligence, and the separate injury occasioned thereby.
The patient may also, while he is under treatment, injure
himself by his own carelessness; yet he may recover of the
physician if he carelessly or unskillfully treats him af-
terwards, and thus does him a distinct injury. In such
cases, the plaintiff's fault does not directly contribute to
produce the injury sued for."8
This same reasoning was applied by the court in Josselyn v. Dear-
born, 19 in which there was disputed evidence that plaintiff negli-
gently injured the affected bodily member during the course of
negligent treatment. The court held that while the plaintiff could
not recover for damages resulting from his own negligence, he
could recover for damages resulting from defendant's negligence
occurring either before or after plaintiff's negligence. 20
If it is kept in mind that there can be no contributory negli-
gence in the absence of negligence on the part of the defendant, 2
1
and that "negligence of the patient, to constitute a bar to the suit,
must have been an active and efficient contributing cause of the
injury; it must have been simultaneous and cooperating with the
fault of the defendant, must have entered into the creation of the
cause of action, and have been an element in the transaction which
constituted it, "22 it should be obvious that if the requisite elements
of primary negligence 23 be made out against a defendant surgeon,
then a plaintiff's prior acts cannot constitute contributory
negligence.
The largest number of cases in which the issue of the patient's
contributory negligence has arisen concerned the patient's failure
18. Hibbard v. Thompson, 109 Mass. 286, 289 (1872).
19. 143 Me. 328, 62 A.2d 174(1948).
20.Josselyn v. Dearborn, 143 Me. 328. -, 62 A.2d 174. 181. 182 (1948).
21 .James, Contributory Negligence. 62 YALE L.J. 691, 697 (1953).
22. Rochester %. Katalan, 320 A,2d 704, 707 (Del. 1974).
23. There must be a duty owed to plaintiff, a breach of that duty, the plaintiff must have been
damaged, and the damages must have proximately arisen from the breach of that duty. W. PROSSER,
supra note 3, at 143.
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to follow instructions of the physician. MuCandless v. McWha,2 4 a
case in which the patient claimed that he was unable to follow his
doctor's orders due to pain, was decided upon principles of primary
negligence, the court stating that if the patient will not conform to
directions, or under the pressure of pain cannot, "his neglect is his
own wrong or misfortune, for which he has no right to hold his
physician responsible. "25 The concurring opinion did address the
question of contributory negligence, stating first that if the
proposed treatment "be painful, injurious and unskillful, he is not
bound to peril his health, and perhaps his life, by submission to
it." ,26 The judge then put the burden of proving the propriety of the
refused treatment on the doctor with the further warning that "it
will not do to cover his own want of skill by raising a mist out of the
refractory disposition of the patient. "27 The opinion then went on
to state that the "intemperate habits" of the patient, rather than
furnishing an excuse for negligence, was an admonition to the
physician that the case called for a greater exercise of skill and care
than would be needed for the ordinary case. 28 Another aspect of the
contributory negligence defense in the malpractice action is that, as
is true generally, 29 the plaintiff's condition is one of the cir-
cumstances to be considered in connection with the question of his
due care, 30 and that a sick man will not be held to the same
standard of conduct as a well man.
3 1
The rule on plaintiff's negligence when occurring subsequent
to the defendant's negligence was stated in Sanderson v. Holland 2 as
follows:
While then it is a good defense, in an action for negli-
gence, that the negligence of the plaintiff (patient), at the
time of the injury, contributed to produce the injury, yet
it is no answer to an action, that the injured party, sub-
sequent to the injury, was guilty of negligence which
aggravated it. The negligence that will constitute a
defense must have concurred in producing the injury.
3
24.22 Pa. 261 (1853).
25. McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261, 268 (1853).
26. Id. at 272.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. W. PROSSER. supra note 3, at 419.




32.39 Mo. App. 233 (1889).
33. Sanderson v. Holland. 39 Mo. App. 233, 239, (1889). See also Bird v. Pritchard, 33 Ohio
App. 2d 31,291 N. E.2d 769 (1973).
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The court held that where the defendant surgeon negligently set
plaintiff's arm, subsequent negligence in nursing care chargeable to
plaintiff would only mitigate the damages, and not bar recovery.
34
When the patient failed to properly brush her teeth as in-
structed by her dentist thereby adding to the damage in Morse v.
Rapkin, 35 the court held that such action of plaintiff went only to
mitigation, stating that "where the gravamen of the action is the
improper profesional treatment, the patient's failure to follow in-
structions does not defeat the action. ", 3
6
If the plaintiff's failure to follow instructions does not result in
any injury there is neither contributory negligence nor mitigation.
In Bird v. Pritchard7 the plaintiff failed to return for a visit three
days after defendant's act, as the patient had been instructed.
However, the irreparable injury had already occurred by the third
day and it could not be said that plaintiff's acts had contributed to
the injury.
Conversely, where plaintiff's acts subsequent to the major act
of treatment but simultaneous with defendant's negligent post-
operative treatment concurs in the creation of the injury, there is no
recovery. Such was the case in Butler v. Berkeley, 3 8 in which plain-
tiff's negligently removing a tube through which he was fed was a
joint factor with defendant's post-operative care causing infection
after plastic surgery, the court holding that plaintiff was thereby
legally "the sole author of his own misfortunes.' 
39
The question has sometimes arisen whether plaintiff's refusal
to submit to certain medical procedures has constituted
contributory negligence. In Morris v. Despain,40 the defendants had
negligently set plaintiff's arm. It was shown that the arm could
probably be broken again and correctly set if plaintiff would allow it
to be reset, which she refused. The court stated as follows:
Appellee was not required to submit to have her limb
rebroken in order to relieve appellants from liability for
lack of ordinary skill and care. Moreover, there was
evidence tending to show that such an operation would be
34. 39 Mo. App. at 240.
35. 24App Div. 2d 24. 263 N.Y.S.2d 428(1965).
36. Miorse %'. Rapkin, 24 App. Div.2d 24, __, 263 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430 (1965).
37. 33 Ohio App. 2d 31. 291 N.E.2d 769 (1973).
38.25 N.C, App. 325. 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975).
39. Butler '. Berkeley. 25 N.C_ App. 325. _. 213 S. E.2d 571. 576 (1975).
40. 104 111. App. 452 (1902).
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
attended with great pain and that at her age and in her
physical condition, there was great danger that it would
prove fatal to her. The law did not require appellee to risk
such danger before she could sustain her suit.
41
A somewhat different situation was present in Hunter v. United
States. 42 There the government physicians negligently failed to per-
form a necessary operation which was consented to. When the
decision was made to go ahead and operate, the plaintiff withdrew
his consent. The court found this to be contributory negligence.
There did not appear to be any good reason for the patient denying
or withdrawing his consent to the surgery.
A fact situation similar to that of the Morris case was found in
Leadingham v. Hillman.43 The rule was set forth as follows:
It is not, as a matter of law, the duty of the injured person
to submit to a serious surgical operation for the purpose
of effecting a cure. He is only required to exercise his best
judgment in the matter, and to do what a reasonable per-
son would do under the circumstances.
44
The court then held that plaintiff's failure to have his arm rebroken
was at most grounds for mitigating damages, and then only if the
jury found that in the exercise of ordinary care he should have sub-
mitted to the rebreaking. 45 The same rule was followed in Dodds v.
Stellar,46 which held that plaintiff's refusal to undergo a suggested
amputation could have been "because of his extended experience,
one ofjustifiable fear of want of their skill. ,47
Summarizing the law of contributory negligence in the
medical malpractice action, most courts require plaintiff's
negligent act to have occurred simultaneously with and in con-
junction with defendant's negligent acts before such will be a bar to
recovery. Mere aggravation of the injury caused by defendant is
not enough. And, where plaintiff's negligence was first in time, the
defendant physician will be held liable for any aggravation of the
injury which he negligently causes, and for the injury itself from the
date of treament if the doctor's negligence prevents a recovery from
41. Morris v. Despain. 104 111. App. 452, 454 (1902).
42. 236 F. Supp. 411 (D.C. Tenn. 1964).
43. 224 Kv. 177, 5 S.W.2d 1044(1928).
44. Leadingham %. Hillman. 224 Kv. 177, , 5 S.W.2d 1044 1045 (1928).
45. Idat -.. , 5 S.W.2d at 1046.
46. 77Cal. App. 2d411. 175 P.2d 607 (1946).
47. Dodds v. Stellar. 77 Cal. App. 2d 411, - , 175 P.2d 607. 613 (1946).
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the ailment which would have been effected but for the want of the
requisite degree of skill and care. In either case, plaintiff can
recover only for those damages attributable to defendant's distinct
negligence. As with all factual issues, plaintiffs' contributory
negligence is a question for the jury unless reasonable minds cannot
differ.
II. INFORMED CONSENT
The core of the "doctrine of informed consent" is that a
patient, before he can be said to validly consent to medical
procedure, must first have been adequately informed of the risks
and benefits of, and the alternatives to, the proposed procedure.
Beyond that, the courts are in disagreement as to whether the ac-
tion sounds in negligence or battery, whether the standard imposed
upon the physician is one of adherence to good medical practice or
to one created wholly by law, the types of risks which must be
disclosed and a myriad of other questions. 48
The foundation of this doctrine is the rule that "every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages. ", 49 From this basic concept, deeply
rooted in the common law, 50 it was an easy extension to create the
requirement that in order for a patient's consent to be valid, it must
be "informed."
Although the concept of informed consent was created as early
as 1918,51 the new wave of cases began with two cases decided in
1960, Natanson v. Kline,52 and Mitchell v. Robinson.53 Both of these
cases were decided upon negligence, although in some states an ac-
tion based upon lack of informed consent is treated as an action for
battery. 54 The vast majority of states do treat the action as one for
negligence. 55
The strongest split in the courts is upon the standard to which
the physician shall be held. In the Natanson case the court ruled that
48. For a collection of a large number of commentaries upon the various issues, see WALTZ &
SCHEUNEMAN, informedconsent to therapy. 64 Nw. U.L. RE%-. 628 N. 1 (1970).
49. Schloendorlt v. Society of N. Y. Hosp.. 211 N.Y. 125. 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
50. V. PROSSER. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 18 (2d ed. 1955).
51. Hunter '. Burroughs. 123 Va. 113. 96 S.E. 360 (1918).
52. 186 Kan. 393. 350 P.2d 1093 (1960). clarified and rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186. 354 P.2d 670
(1960).
53. 334 S.\V.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
54. See. e... Scott v. Wilson. 396 S.\.2d 532 (Tex. Civil App. 1965).




the duty of the physician to disclose was "limited to those
disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make
under the same or similar circumstances.'' 56 Although the Mitchell
case held that expert testimony was not required in an informed
consent case, 57 this point was overruled in Aiken v. Clary5 8 in which
the court held that to sustain his burden of proof, the plaintiff must
introduce expert testimony of what a reasonable medical prac-
titioner would have disclosed under the same or similar cir-
cumstances. 59 This is the majority rule.
The leading case on the other position taken by some courts is
Centerbury v. Spence. 60 The court's analysis of the problem began
with the premise that a person has the basic right to decide what
shall be done with his own body. 6' Seeing this as the basis for in-
formed consent, the court had no difficulty in finding that "respect
for the patient's right of self-determination on particular therapy
demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which
physicians may or may not impose upon themselves. "62 The test
formulated by the court for determining whether a risk should be
divulged began with the proposition that "all risks potentially af-
fecting the [patient's] decision must be unmasked." ' 63 The
limitations upon this rule are: (1) that the materiality of the risk is
decided upon a reasonable person basis, i.e. whether a reasonable
person would deem the risk material; (2) that an emergency patient
unable to consent, as for example an unconscious patient, need not
be given the information concerning the procedure; and (3) that a
risk need not be divulged if there are theraputic reasons for not
revealing the risk to the patient. 64 These last two limitations are
also applied to the majority rule. 65 This test requires some un-
derstanding on the part of the physician, for the over-reacting doc-
tor may find himself in the position of the defendant in Ferrara v.
Galluchio,66 in which the court held that there was a duty not to
56. 186 Kan. at-., 350 P.2d at 1106.
57. 334 S.W.2d at 16.
58. 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
59. Aiken v. Clarv, 396 S.W.2d 668. 675 (Mo. 1965).
60. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. App. 1972). rehearingdenied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
61. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772. 780 (D.C. App. 1972). quotingSchoendorfv. Society of
N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125. 105 N.E. 92(1914).
62. 464 F.2d at 784.
63. Id. at 787.
64. Id. at 787-89. On the last limitation, the court was careftul to note that the privilege to
withhold information for theraputic reasons must be carefully circumscribed, and that a physician
may not withhold information simply because he might feel that its revelation might cause the
patient to undergo a procedure which the physician feels is necessary.
65. See, e.g., Roberts v. Woods. 206 F. Supp. 579, 583 (S.D. Ala. 1962): Koury v. Folio, 272
N.C. 366, __. 158 S.E,2d 548, 555 (1968).
66.5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249. 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
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unduly alarm a patient with an unnecessary disclosure upon the
risks involved.
It should be noted that there are exceptions to the general
limitation of both the majority and minority rules which obviate the
necessity of making disclosure. For example, if the parents of a
minor are available, their consent, with all that must accompany it,
is required. 67 And where an adult patient is unable to understand
the risks involved and cannot make an informed decision, as when
the physical condition itself or the treatment thereof renders a
patient incoherent or incapable of understanding or reasoning,
then the informed consent of the patient's relatives must be ob-
tained. 68 Informing the patient's relatives and even minister can be
required not only to obtain their consent but also for the purpose of
enabling them to obtain, by means of their position of trust with the
patient, the consent of the patient himself. 6
9
Although most of the cases have dealt with nondisclosure of
risks, the required revelations include anything which might affect
a patient's decision.
A doctor has the duty to make a reasonable disclosure to
his patient of the significant risks in view of the gravity of
the patient's condition, the probabilities of success, and
any alternative treatment or procedures, if such are
reasonably appropriate, so that the patient has the in-
formation reasonably necessary to form the basis of an in-
telligent and informed consent to the proposed treatment
or procedure. 70
Even though a patient may be thoroughly informed of the
procedure which he undergoes, the physician may still be liable if a
known risk inherent in that procedure, but not in an alternative
procedure not known to the patient, becomes a reality and the
patient would have chosen the undisclosed procedure over the one
actually performed.
The issue of causation has troubled the courts slightly. Ob-
viously, for the patient to recover, it is necessary that he show that,
had he been adequately informed of the risks, alternatives, etc., he
67. Bonner v. Moran. 7 D. C App. 156. 126 F.2d 121 (1941).
68. Morris, Malpractice: .1lrdical- The Important Events ofthe Past Two Years, 30 INS. COUNSELJ. 44,
56(1963).
69. Steele v. Woods. 327 SW.2d 187 (Mo. 1959).
70. Cumininghan ' v. Yankton Clinic, 262 N.\W.2d 508 (S.D. 1978).
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would not have undergone the procedure to which he had con-
sented. As has been pointed out71 it is asking too much to expect the
patient, after he has actually experienced the injury, to be able to
truthfully and objectively state whether he would have consented to
the procedure had he been properly informed of the risk ofjust such
an injury. The Canterbury court ruled that causation is to be
established objectively, by use of the reasonable standard. That is,
the jury must find that a person could reasonably be expected to not
undergo the procedure were he to be informed of the risk.7 2 This
appears to be contrary to the rule which the court laid down, that
the physician must reveal any risk potentially affecting the patient's
decision, although the court's causation rule is tempered somewhat
by allowing the plaintiff to testify concerning whether he would
have accepted the proposed treatment. 7 3 Another court has set forth
a considerably more amorphous standard. In Aiken v. Clary, 14 the
defendant compalined that plaintiff had failed to make a sub-
missible case in that there was no proof that plaintiff would not
have consented to the procedure if he had been informed of the
risks. The court's reply was as follows:
Such testimony is not required. . . .Such a requirement
would make recovery impossible in the case of a patient
who died or, as here, was unable to testify. This does not
mean, however, that plaintiff is not required to establish a
causal connection between the doctor's failure sufficently
to inform and the injury for which recovery is sought.
The matter of causation still must be submitted to the
jury. 7
5
The only requirement then imposed upon the jury was that they
must believe that the plaintiff would not have consented had the
risks been explained. Perhaps this standard does allow too much
emphasis upon plaintiff's post-injury, subjective testimony. Proper
cross-examination and closing argument techniques should remedy
that problem, however. And it allows for greater consideration of
the subjective factors which enter any individual's consideration of
what he does and does not wish to have done with his body.
/1. Waltz & Scheuneman. Informed Consent to I'herapy. 64 Nw. U.1. Rt '. 628. 646-48(1970)-
72. 464 F.2d at 791.
73. Id.
74. 396 S.W.2d 668 (NIo, 1965).
75. Id. at 676.
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III. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Assumption of risk "has been a subject of much controversy,
and has been surrounded by much confusion, because 'assumption
of risk' has been used by the courts in several different senses,
which have been lumped together under the one name, usually
without realizing that any differences exist, and certainly with no
effort made to make them clear.' '76 This confusion has had effect
on the law of assumption of risk as it applies to medical malpractice
suits.
Prosser divides assumption of risk into three general cat-
egories: (1) where the plaintiff has agreed to relieve the defend-.
ant of any duty of care to him; (2) where the plaintiff voluntarily
enters into some relation with the defendant with knowledge that
the defendant will not protect the plaintiff; and (3) where the de-
fendant has already negligently created a risk and the plaintiff
voluntarily exposes himself to the risk. 77 A more thorough
breakdown, and one which is better suited for analysis of
assumption of risk in the field of malpractice, is found in Meistrich v.
Casino Arena Attractions,78 and will be used here. The breakdown
there was: (1) contractual waiver of liability; (2) consensual waiver,
as for example where one participates in a contact sport; and (3)
where the injury was neither intended nor contractually made non-
actionable. Within the last category, assumption of risk is broken
down into its primary meaning, that the defendant either owed no
duty or did not breach such duty; and its secondary meaning, that
the plaintiff either unreasonably encountered a known (or
reasonably discoverable) risk, or unreasonably conducted himself
once he reasonably encountered such a risk. 79
The first category is not important to malpractice law, because
any attempt by a physician to contract away his liability for his
negligence toward a patient will be declared void as "contrary to
the precepts of public policy." ,8 0 The secondary category is covered
by the doctrine of informed consent, which has already been
discussed. Within the last category, the primary type of assumption
of risk centers simply upon whether the defendant was negligent or
not and does not concern the plaintiff's acts, except insofar as they
may have been the cause of his injuries.
76. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 439.
77.Id at 440.
78.31 N.J. 44. 155 A.2d 90(1959).
79. Meistrich v. Casino Area Attractions, 31 N. J. 44.-.155 A.2d 90,93 (1959).
80. Hales v. Raines. 162 Mo. App. 46. 141 S.W. 917. 923 (1911).
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This leaves from within the last category, the secondary type
of assumption of risk available as a defense to the medical malprac-
tice action. The general statement has been made that a patient
never assumes the risk of the negligence of the treating physician, 81
but this rule is not without its exceptions.
In Champs v. Stone, 82 the plaintiff went to defendant for a series
of injections. On one occasion, the defendant was quite obviously
intoxicated. After much coaxing by defendant the plaintiff agreed
to let defendant perform the injection, which the defendant
proceeded to do in a negligent manner. The court held that plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence and had assumed the risk of
the defendant negligently performing the injection,8 3 thereby
equating assumption of risk with contributory negligence.
In Kirschner v. Keller, 84 plaintiff went to a chiropractor who
removed plaintiff from a drug which he had been taking to assist in
controlling his epileptic condition. In regards to plaintiff's claim
that defendant's withdrawing plaintiff from the drug increased
plaintiff's epileptic seizures both in number and intensity, the court
held that by his knowingly seeking treatment by a drugless prac-
titioner plaintiff thereby assumed all of the risks attendant with
such treatment, the maxim volenti non fit injuria being applied.
85
Such cases appear to be contrary to the principle that the
standard of skill to which the practioner will be held is one set by
law. 86 In Nelson v. Harrington,7 the plaintiff knowingly secured the
services of a clairvoyant physician. To defendant's claim that he
should not be held to the standard to which a physician of orthodox
medicine is held, the court replied as follows:
One who holds himself out as a healer of diseases, and ac-
cepts employmet as such, must be held to the duty of
reasonable skill in the exercise of his vocation. Failing in
this, he must be held liable for any damages proximately
caused by unskillful treatment of his patient. . . .The
theory upon which an expert practices his profession,
or trade, the sources from whence he derived his
knowledge of it, the tools and appliances he employs in
81. Valdez %. Percy, 35 Cal. 2d 338, 217 P.2d 422 (1950); Los Alamos Medical Center v. Coe,
58 N.M. 686, 275 P.2d 175 (1954).
82. 74 Ohio App. 344, 58 N.E.2d 803 (1944).
83. Champs v. Stone, 74 Ohio App. 344- 58 N.E.2d 803,803(1944)
84. 70 Ohio App. 111,42 N.E.2d 463 (1942).
85. Kirschner v. Keller, 70 Ohio App. 111,-,58 N.E.2d 463. 463 (1942). Accord, Mainfort v.
Giannestras, 67 Ohio Abs. 380, 49 Ohio O. 440, 111 N.E.2d 692 (1951).
86. Parkell N. Fitzporter. 301 Mo. 217.-.256 S.W.239. 242 (1923).
87. 72Wis. 591,40 N.W. 228 (1888).
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the exercise of his calling, his methods of work, are not
controlling considerations. . . .The law. . . only takes
cognizance of the question, did the practioner or expert
render the service he undertook in a reasonable skillful
manner?88
This is in line with the rule that the foundation of the physician-
patient relationship is laid on the theory that the relevant sub-
ject matter is one in which the physician is knowledgeable and the
patient is ignorant, and that the "ignorant and ailing layman
ordinarily relies implicitly on the word of the physician." 8 9
Closely related is the situation in which the physician follows
the advice of the patient rather than his own. In Gramm v. Boener, 90
plaintiff's set arm did not heal in proper alignment and he
requested the defendant to rebreak and reset the arm which,
although against his better judgment, the defendant did. The court
held that the plaintiff had substituted his own judgment for that of
his physician, and applied the maxim volenti non fit injuria.91 In light
of the fact that a patient's consent to an operation does not relieve a
physician from his negligence in deciding upon recommending or
performing such an operation, 92 the result in Gramm appears to
erroneous. 93
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THREE DOC-
TRINES AS APPLIED TO ACCEPTING OR REJECTING
TREATMENT
Informed consent is concerned with the patient's decision
whether to accept or reject treatment, as is assumption of risk when
the defense is usually interposed. The defense of contributory neg-
ligence occurs in cases dealing with a patient's decision regard-
ing treatment with a frequency second only to cases where the
patient negligently failed to follow his physician's instructions.
Therefore, the interrelationship of these three legal principles in the
situation in which the patient makes a choice as to, or consents to,
88. Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591,-,40 N.W. 228. 233 (1888). See also Logan v. Weltmer,
180 Mc. 322. 79S. W. 653(1904).
89. Halverson v. Zimmerman. 60 N. D. at 120-21. 232 N.W. at 757.
90. 56 1d. 497 (1877).
91. Gramm v. Boener. 56 Ind. 497. 502 (1877).
92. Valdez v. Perc\. 35 Cal. 2d 338. 217 P.2d 422 (1950).
93. For a similar opinion see Smith. Antecedent Grounds of Liability it the Practice qf Surfery, 14
ROCKY N'TN. L. REV. 233. 289 (1942). See D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS. 1 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 243
n. 15 (1973) which although discussing the Gramm case favorably, does cite the Smith article and then
states that
IV'hen the problem of Gramin v. Boener is analyzed in terms of a physician's duty
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treatment is important in many medical malpractice cases. And as
stated, the relationship is important even in those jurisdictions
which have adopted comparative negligence. 9
4
If a plaintiff is provided with insufficient information to
knowingly and intelligently consent to a procedure, that patient is
unable to assume the risks of that procedure. This is clear as to the
assenting type of assumption risk, for a plaintiff will not be held
to have assumed the risks of which he had no knowledge. 95 And as
regards the secondary type of assumption of risk, there must be
some type of acceptance of the risk, whether actual or con-
structive, 96 before the plaintiff will be denied recovery. In either
event the physician's failure to explain the risks will prevent the
patient from being in a position where it could be said that he
assumed the risks of his consenting to or refusing proffered treat-
ment.97
Although no court has yet expressly so held, it is possible to use
presently existing legal principles to conclude that an individual
cannot be contributorily negligent in a medical malpractice action.
It is well established that a plaintiff is not to be required to sur-
render a valuable right merely because of conduct on the part of the
defendant which threatens plaintiff with what would otherwise be
an unreasonable risk.98 IfJustice Cardozo's important statement99
is to be given its full logical effect, it would be impossible for an
individual's exercise of his right to determine what shall be done to
his body to constitute contributory negligence. Of course, a
physician would not be chargeable with negligence in not
performing the refused treatment. This would, however, prevent
the defendant physician from setting up the plaintiff's acts as the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries if the defendant is negligent.
It appears, then, that it is possible for the defendant to be held
fully liable for the effects of his negligence where the only defense
offered is plaintiff's negligently refusing treatment or his assuming
the risks of the treatment rendered.
rather than a patient's assumption of risk, it seems more difficult to accept the
proposition that a physician isjustified in undertaking a procedure which he believes is
not good practice merely because a patient requests it. A patient's wishes may be a
relevant factor where medical judgment is doubtful, but for the physician explicitly to
violate such judgment only because of the importunities of the patient seems highlyk
questionable.
94. The importance of'some of the distinction vanishes where contributory negligence and
assumption of risk in its secondary meaning have been combined, or where both are subject to
provisions of comparative negligence statutes.
95. Calanchini v. Bliss, 88 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1937).
96- Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1218 at §§ 4, 5 (1962).
97. This result is suggested in D. LOuISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 93, which states '[ilt's
[(the defense of assumption of risk)] availability may directly depend upon the physician's diligence
and effectiveness in exposing and explaining risks to the patient." Id. at 246.
98. W. PROSSER, supra note 3 at 425.
99. Supra note 49 and text accompanying.

